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ABSTRACT
We examine the impact of tort reforms using U.S. birth records for 1989-2001. We make four contributions:
First, we develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by specific tort reforms. Second, we
assemble new data on tort reform. Third, we examine a range of outcomes. Finally, we allow for differential
effects by demographic/risk group. We find that reforms of the "deep pockets rule" reduce complications
of labor and C-sections, while caps on noneconomic damages increase them. Our results demonstrate
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bentley.macleod@columbia.eduWhile most tort reforms apply to all sorts of torts, much of the literature on tort reform has
focused on its e￿ects on medical practice. In a seminal study, Kessler and McClellan (1996) explore
the impact of two broad classes of tort reform on medical costs and outcomes for a population of
elderly heart patients. They ￿nd that tort reforms have no signi￿cant e￿ect on health outcomes,
while signi￿cantly reducing medical costs. From this evidence they conclude that the practice of
defensive medicine is reduced in response to tort reform.
We show that this does not appear to be true for at least one large and important class of cases -
child births in the United States. Child birth is an interesting example to study because it is one of
the most common medical procedures, and because obstetrics is thought to have been particularly
hard hit by malpractice concerns. For example, Bakalar (2005) argues that the recent run up in the
rate of Ceasarean sections in the U.S. (which reached 30 percent in 2004, up from approximately
20 percent in the 1980s) is driven primarily by fear of litigation.
Using data from national vital statistics natality ￿les on millions of individual births from 1989
to 2001, we ask whether speci￿c tort reforms a￿ect the types of procedures that are performed, and
the health outcomes of mothers and their infants. We focus on four of the most important reforms -
caps on punitive damages, caps on non-economic damages (pain and su￿ering), reform of the rule of
joint and several liability (JSL, the so called deep pockets rule), and reforms of the collateral source
rule. The ￿rst two types of caps are the most important examples of what Kessler and McClellan
(1996) call direct reforms, while the later two reforms correspond to what they call indirect reforms.
Our analysis is informed by a model that allows physician error rates and procedure choices to
depend on the patient’s condition. This is important because the right procedure will be evident
in many cases ￿ it is in the marginal cases that the incentives created by tort reform may change
physician choices. In addition, we introduce a new way to model JSL. The common law rule of
JSL allows patients to recover full damages from any one of several defendants. Reforms typically
state that the defendants cannot be sued for the full damages unless they are responsible for at
2least a given minimum fraction of the harm. We model JSL reform as an increase in the correlation
between the care taken by physicians and the expected liability that they face. We show that
reforms of this type lead physicians to take more care, while damage caps result in less care by the
physician. Moreover, if a procedure is more risky than no procedure then caps are predicted to
increase procedure use, while JSL reform is predicted to reduce procedure use.
Intuitively, if many doctors are performing procedures in marginal cases not because of fear of
liability but because the procedures are more pro￿table and less time consuming than the alter-
natives, 3 then these doctors may be more likely to perform these procedures when they are less
fearful of liability. On the other hand, under JSL reform doctors are held more accountable for their
own actions (and are less likely to be held liable for the torts committed by others). This results in
more care being taken and fewer procedures. This results in the testable prediction that the e￿ect
of damage caps upon procedure use should be the opposite of the e￿ect of reform to JSL.
Our ￿ndings are consistent with this model. We ￿nd that reforms of JSL reduce induction and
stimulation of labor, C-sections, and complications of labor and delivery, while caps on non-economic
damages increase them. There is little evidence that increases in procedure use induced by damage
caps a￿ect infant health, suggesting that the marginal procedures induced or discouraged by tort
reform have little impact on infant health.
These results are robust to many changes in speci￿cation. For example, we estimate models
separately for high risk patients since our model implies that physicians have less discretion in high
risk cases. We also attempt to distinguish a class of complications that are not preventable by
physician e￿ort, and ￿nd that tort reform has no e￿ect on these complications, while it reduces
other complications. We estimate models excluding one large state at a time (to see if results are
sensitive to the inclusion of one large state), and show that if anything our results are stronger if
we delete states with laws that applied only to medical practice. Finally, we estimate models with
leads and lags of the law changes. Because of a peculiarity in the law, laws turning ￿on￿ do not
3have the same e￿ect as laws which are turned ￿o￿￿ because they are ruled unconstitutional. New
laws are not retroactive, while if a law is overturned, the new regime applies to cases begun under
the old regime. We exploit this asymmetry and show that leads of laws turning on have no e￿ect,
while leads of laws turning o￿ do have e￿ects, as we expect. Lagged changes also sometimes have
e￿ects, in a direction consistent with our model.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section II provides some necessary background
regarding tort reform and infant health. A theoretical analysis of tort reform appears in Section
III. Section IV describes the data, our empirical methods are described in Section V, results are
presented in Section VI, and conclusions follow in Section VII.
II. Background
In his survey of the literature on tort reform, Holtz-Eakin (2004) concludes that the most con-
sistent ￿nding is that caps on damages reduce the number of lawsuits, the value of awards made
as a result of lawsuits, and the number of payouts made by insurers relative to premiums. 4 Mello
(2006) draws similar conclusions in his review of the tort reform literature. Avraham (2006) uses
a national data base of medical malpractice payments and concludes that caps on non-economic
damages a￿ect the size of observed payments. However, an important issue in all of these studies
is that the probability that a tort is committed, a suit is ￿le, and a payment is observed is likely to
depend on the underlying malpractice environment.
High claims in turn are thought to lead to excessively high malpractice insurance premiums. 5
But it is not clear why a doctor’s e￿ort level or choice of procedure would be strongly a￿ected by
malpractice insurance premiums. Doctors’ premiums are not experience rated, but are set at the
specialty-area level. Hence, short of moving from a high premium area to another area, or leaving
their specialty entirely, there is little a doctor can do to a￿ect her premiums. 6 Claims against
doctors seldom exceed the amount that they are insured for (Lawthers et al., 1992; Silver et al.
42006). Moreover, doctors can pass on the cost of malpractice insurance premiums in the form of
higher prices (Danzon, Pauly, and Kington, 1990). Thus doctors generally face little ￿nancial risk
from malpractice claims.
One might wonder then, why doctors apparently care so deeply about the problem of legal
liability? There are many non-insurable costs involved in malpractice litigation. In addition to the
psychic and time costs of a potential legal proceeding, there is a very real threat of harm to the
doctor’s reputation. Any payment made on behalf of a physician to settle a claim of malpractice
must be registered in the federally-maintained National Practitioner’s Data Base (NPDB). This
data bank can be searched by hospitals, other health care professionals, and in some cases, by
plainti￿s’ lawyers.
These facts about the malpractice insurance market suggest that doctors should care deeply about
their probability of being sued. Hence, tort reforms are likely to a￿ect doctor behavior primarily
by a￿ecting the probability of a suit. Reforms that reduce payments in the event of a successful
suit may still be important however, because they are likely to reduce the probability that suits
are brought. The important implication for empirical work on this subject is that the probability
of a suit can respond quickly to tort reform, while premiums will be a￿ected by tort reforms only
with a relatively long and uncertain lag. (The mean time between an injury and the settlement of
a claim in the NPDB is 6 years). Hence, it is perhaps unsurprising that previous work focusing on
the e￿ects of malpractice premiums on physician behavior have shown little e￿ect. 7
Holtz-Eakin o￿ers a useful summary of the most common state-level tort reforms. We focus on
the four most common, which can be de￿ned as follows (see Bryan Garner, 1999):
(1) Caps on non-economic damages: Non-economic damages cover items other than monetary
losses, such as pain and su￿ering.
5(2) Caps on punitive damages: Punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory
(economic and non-economic) damages in order to punish defendants for willful and wanton
conduct.
(3) Modi￿cations of the collateral-source rule: Under the common law collateral-source rule
(CSR), amounts that a plainti￿ receives from sources other than the defendant (e.g. from
their own insurance) may not be admitted as evidence in a trial.8
(4) Modi￿cations of the joint-and-several liability rule: In a trial with more than one defendant,
the ￿rst step is to apportion blame for the harm. Under JSL, the plainti￿ can then ask the
￿deep pockets￿ defendant to pay all of the damages, even if that defendant was responsible
for only a small fraction of the harm. This defendant can in turn initiate separate legal
proceedings in order to get ￿contribution￿ from the other defendants. Thus, the onus is on
the deep pockets defendant rather than the plainti￿ to collect from the other defendants.
In this paper we focus on modi￿cations of the common law rule such that a defendant had
to be liable for at least 50 percent of the tort before they could be held responsible for 100
percent of the damages.9
Table 1 shows information about the 25 states with changes in these tort laws between 1989 and
2001. We are particularly interested in changes given that we will include county ￿xed e￿ects in
our model￿hence, only changes in the laws are used to identify their e￿ects. Given the controversy
surrounding tort reform, and the ￿urry of tort reform activity that occurred in the 1980s, it is
striking that changes to the tort system during the 1990s often involved turning tort reforms "o￿"
rather than "on". Two states (Illinois and Ohio) passed packages of tort reforms only to ￿nd that
the laws violated the state constitution and had to be removed two years later. The fact that laws
turn on and o￿ is useful for identi￿cation, and helps to ensure that we will not mistake general time
trends in outcomes for the e￿ects of tort reform.10
6Table 1 also indicates that most of the law changes were changes to general tort statutes and
were not aimed speci￿cally at medical malpractice. This point is important because it suggests that
most of these law changes were not motivated by things like pre-existing trends in C-section rates or
complications of labor and delivery. For example, if caps were passed in an e￿ort to reduce C-section
rates, then caps might be viewed as a result of high C-section rates rather than as a potential cause
of high (or low) C-section rates. However, there is little evidence that most tort laws were passed
in response to speci￿c developments in obstetrical practice, and most of the laws apply to all torts.
Indeed the movement towards tort reform gained impetus from the publicity attending the famous
case of the women who was severely burned by MacDonald’s co￿ee (Liebeck vs. MacDonald, 1992).
The many laws that were turned ￿o￿￿ by state courts also assure the exogeneity of the law changes,
since these cases tended to revolve around the constitutionality of state statutes rather than any
desire on the part of courts to in￿uence obstetrical practice.
Kessler and McLellan (2002, 2002b) extend their earlier work, with elderly heart patients and
further ￿nd that managed care is a substitute for tort reform (both reduce procedure use without
a￿ecting outcomes), and that tort reform reduces malpractice risks faced by physicians and has a
larger e￿ect on diagnostic rather than therapeutic treatment decisions. Our work builds on theirs
by considering the e￿ects of speci￿c tort reforms, rather than a composite indicator of "direct" or
"indirect" tort reform, using a di￿erent medical context (child birth), and more recent data. As
we will show below, di￿erent types of reforms are likely to have quite di￿erent e￿ects, and whether
tort reforms increase or decrease procedure use in any particular case is a matter to be determined
empirically.
A. Procedure choice and physician incentives . Most literature on procedure use in obstetrics
focuses on C-sections. There is a good deal of research showing that C-section rates are responsive
to physician incentives, and that American C-section rates are ￿too high￿. A Healthy People 2010
7goal is to reduce the rate of C-sections to 15 percent from the current 30 percent. This ￿gure
suggests that unnecessary C-sections contribute as much as four billion dollars a year in excessive
health care costs, as well as in￿icting unnecessary surgery on million of mothers. 11 Baicker, Buckles,
and Chandra (2005) ￿nd that 75 percent of the geographical variation in C-section rates over the
1995 to 1998 period is not explained by di￿erences in risk factors, and that the marginal C-section
was performed on a medically less appropriate patient. They also ￿nd that higher C-section rates
are not associated with improvements in infant health, a ￿nding that is common in this literature.
One reason for high rates of C-sections is that fees for C-sections are roughly double fees for normal
deliveries. Keeler and Brodie (1993), Currie and Gruber (2001), Currie, Gruber and Fischer (1995)
and Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin (1998) all show that physicians are responsive to the incentives
created by di￿erentials between fees for vaginal births and Caesarean births.
It is important to stress that unnecessary C-sections do entail risks to mothers and infants.
Common problems include sponges or other medical equipment left inside the patient, infections,
and impairments to women’s future fertility. In Meador v. Stahler and Gheridian (1993) a
Massachusetts woman won a $1.53 million verdict arguing that her physicians had not obtained
informed consent because they had not adequately explained the risks of the procedure. Ms. Meador
was bedridden for several years as a result of complications resulting from her surgery. Infants can
also be injured during C-sections. For example, in Bowen v. Hearn (1988) an infant was cut on the
cheek, while in Hurst v. Dougherty (1990) part of an infant’s ￿nger was accidentally amputated.
The evidence suggests that C-sections are highly responsive to physician incentives and are a
good procedure to examine for evidence regarding the e￿ects of tort reform. There has been little
attempt to look at other obstetrical procedures or maternal outcomes in the previous literature.
In addition to C-sections, we will focus on induction or stimulation of labor, the incidence of
complications of labor and delivery, and infant APGAR scores. Induction/stimulation of labor is
an interesting procedure to look at in conjunction with C-sections because there is thought to be
8a link between induction and unscheduled C-sections. Complications are a particularly interesting
outcome because, as we argue below, some complications may be avoidable by greater physician
e￿ort, and because they represent real health costs. Finally, for our purposes APGAR scores are a
good measure of infant health outcomes.12 APGAR measures the state of the child at birth, and
could be in￿uenced by the choice of procedure, and the physician’s actions at the time of delivery.
III. Tort Law, Procedure Choice and Defensive Medicine
This section introduces a model of the e￿ect of tort reform on physician care and procedure
choice. The model extends the standard tort model by explicitly accounting for the fact that both
physician decision making and liability are functions of a patient’s condition. Our focus is on the
ex ante e￿ects of tort reform - namely how changes in the law a￿ect physician choices. In contrast,
much of the law and economics literature, particularly the literature on joint and several liability,
explores the e￿ect of the law on the process of litigation. This literature deals with issues such as
when parties ￿le suit, how the law a￿ects settlements, and how juries measure damages (see Spier
(2007) for a comprehensive survey). This literature shows that the process governing the way that
a tort ￿nally gets translated into a liability against a physician is extremely complex. But at the
moment, the data is simply not su￿ciently rich to distinguish between these complex models.
We focus instead on the e￿ect of the law on physician choices at the time of service. We assume
that physicians do take liability into account, but in a very reduced form way that depends on
the net bene￿ts and costs of treatment. For the period of interest all tort suits are based on the
negligence standard. Hence, a physician faces liability if and only if her behavior is found to be
negligent, that is below the community standard of care. As discussed in Arlen and MacLeod (2005),
even if a physician is careful, there is always a chance that he or she will make a mistake that can
give rise to liability. These error rates are a key feature of our model.
9We de￿ne α as the probability that a physician makes an error that results in a potential tort
liability. Let H(p,law,s) be the expected liability given that the physician has made an error (hence
the H function also incorporates the fact that not all errors lead to liability). Liability is a function
of procedure choice, p, the law at the time of treatment, law, and the condition of the patient, s.
Procedure choice is denoted by p = P orNP, where p = P indicates that the procedure is performed,
and p = NP indicates it is not performed. The procedures we observe in our data are Caesarean
sections and the induction or stimulation of labor and delivery. It is assumed that patient condition
is worse for higher s, and hence s = 0 is the least complicated case (i.e. a completely straightforward
natural delivery, with no harm likely to mother or child). Let G(s) denote the distribution of patient
cases (the fraction of cases where patient condition s0 is less than or equal to s).
The physician’s preferences are assumed to have the form:
(1) U (s,α,p,law) = B (s,α,p) − H (s,p,law)α,
where B(α,p,s) is the bene￿t from treatment. This includes the intrinsic reward from treating the
patient, any pecuniary rewards from treatment, and the opportunity cost of care, α. The physician
chooses α∗(p,s,law), to maximize her payo￿, where α∗is uniquely characterized by:
(2) 0 = Uα = Bα(s,α∗,p) − H(s,p,law).
Let U∗(s,p,law) be the physician’s payo￿ given that she chooses the optimal error rate given
procedure choice, patient condition and current law. The physician chooses to do the procedure
if and only if it is preferred to no procedure (U∗(s,P,law) = U∗(s,NP,law)). The procedure is
assumed to be needed for more serious cases and not needed for completely straightforward cases,
and it is also assumed that utility rises more quickly with s when a procedure is performed than




for all s = 0. Given that the procedure is unnecessary when s = 0, there is a unique patient condition
that is a function of the current law, ¯ s(law), such that the physician is indi￿erent between performing
the procedure and not performing:
(4) U∗(¯ s(law),P,law) = U∗(¯ s(law),NP,law),
When the patient has condition s > ¯ s(law) then the physician chooses to perform the proceedure.
Conversly, for s < ¯ s(law) no procedure is performed. Hence, the rate of procedure use increases
with a change in the law if and only this results in a fall in ¯ s.
Given this model, it is straightforward to demonstrate two propositions whose proofs are found
in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Tort reform will increase the error rate if and only if the law decreases the liability
the physician incurs in the event of an error.
This result follows from two e￿ects. First, conditional upon procedure choice, a decrease in
liability leads to less care and hence a higher error rate. In addition, for marginal proceedures, a
decrease in liability results in the ￿rm making riskier proceedure choices. Together, this results in
a higher over all error rate.
The e￿ect of the law on procedure choice depends on the way that it e￿ects the cuto￿ value ¯ s.
We make one additional assumption (a uniformity condition), which is that the e￿ect of the law on
liability is independent of procedure choice and patient condition. In other words, conditional on
the state of the patient, a law that changes the liability in the event of an error has the same e￿ect
11whether the error occurred as a result of performing a procedure, or as a result of not performing
a procedure. Given this assumption we have:
Proposition 2. A legal change that increases physician liability will increase ¯ s (and therefore de-
crease procedure use) if and only if the error rate when the procedure is chosen is higher than the
error rate when the procedure is not chosen.
This result is quite intutitive. An increase in liability results in the physician making decision that
lower risk. Hence, the choice between performing the proceedure or not depends upon the relative
risks associated with the two choices. This result shows that by observing how physicians respond
to changes in liability provides information regarding the riskiness of a procedure. We detail how
this e￿ect work for damage caps and JSL in the next two subsections.
A. The E￿ect of Damage Caps. Limits on damage caps are intended curb unnecessarily large
awards. One can see this in the context of our model. Suppose that the uniformity condition is
satis￿ed, and that conditional on an error occurring, the distribution of possible harm, h, is given by
the density and cumulative distributions f (·) and F (·). Let ¯ L be a cap on damages, then expected












This is the expected payment for harms less than ¯ L, plus the payment ¯ L times the probability
that the cap is reached. The marginal e￿ect of the cap on liability is :




This is positive, and therefore from propositions 1 and 2 it follows that reforms that reduce the
liability cap should result in a increase in the error rate. It is reasonable to assume that the error rate
12is correlated with complications of delivery, and hence we would expect complications to increase
with caps.
The e￿ect on procedure choice is more complicated because it depends on the relative error rates
for each procedure choice at ¯ s. Again, if procedure use is relatively more risky than no procedure
for the patient with condition ¯ s then condition 5 and proposition 2 together imply that reductions
in the cap on damages will increase procedure use. We illustrate these e￿ects in ￿gure 1.
Figure 1 Here
Suppose we begin with a level of procedure choice as illustrated by point X. Now suppose there
is a decrease in liability. If this were to a￿ect only cases with no procedure, then we have the utility
from no procedure rising, as illustrated by the dotted line, resulting in a decrease in procedure use to
point Y. Now, if there are also signi￿cant errors when the procedure is performed, the the decrease
in liability results in the utility from carrying out the procedure rising to the dashed line in ￿gure
1. If the increase in utility is su￿cient, then we can arrive at point Z, an increase in procedure use
relative to the starting point X.
B. The E￿ect of Joint and Several Liability . Under Joint and Several Liability the plainti￿
can recover from any individual who shares in the blame for the accident. Kessler and McClellan
(1996) call this an indirect reform because it does not directly constrain the level of damages.
Rather, it a￿ects who is liable for damages. It is believed that this reform can reduce liability by
removing the incentive for plainti￿s to attempt to recover from the deep pocket when there is a
medical error.
In practice, JSL means that if the physician makes a mistake during a delivery and the attending
nurse has some culpability, then the patient may sue the nurse’s employer, usually the hospital, for
13full damages. This is because unlike the physician, the nurse is an employee of the hospital, which is
the deep pocket in the case. Previous research has focused on the way JSL reform might a￿ect the
litigation process. In a seminal study, Landes and Posner (1980) argue that the common law rule
of JSL approximates an e￿cient rule if there is contribution.13 Contribution means that the deep
pocket defendant who pays the plainti￿ sues to collect from the other defendants in proportion to
the harm they have caused. In the absence of any transactions costs, the Coase theorem suggests
that parties would always achieve an e￿cient allocation of costs among themselves, and hence JSL
reform should have no e￿ect.
However, suit and settlement is a complex process, and as Kornhauser and Revesz (1989) and
Kornhauser and Klee (2007) have shown, the e￿ect of JSL reform upon the ex ante incentive to take
care is complex. Depending on the structure of the available information, incentives to take care may
increase or decrease. The problem is similar to the question of how owners can provide incentives
to the managers of a ￿rm. In the absence of transactions costs, the Coase theorem suggests that
owners of the ￿rm should be able to write an e￿cient contract with management. In practice, as
Jensen and Meckling (1977) argue, owners cannot achieve the ￿rst best. What they can do is to
reduce agency costs by more closely aligning rewards with compensation.
This is exactly what JSL reform achieves. It more closely aligns the risk of liability with the
tortfeasor’s care level. We model this point by supposing that the common law rule causes spillover
e￿ects on liability. More precisely, we suppose that the physician’s legal liability is given by:
HJSL (λ) = λ ¯ HDα∗ (λ) + (1 − λ) ¯ HHαH, (6)
where λ captures the JSL regime. When λ = 1 then the physician is liable only for her own errors,
which have an expected value of ¯ HD. In contrast, under JSL, there is a chance that the hospital
will pay for some or all of harm caused by the physician, in which case λ < 1. By symmetry, it is
14also the case that the physician is liable for some of the harm caused by hospital employees. Even if
a nurse is mainly responsible for an error, the physician supervising her work will usually be named
in any suits arising from the error. It may also be the case that if a hospital resident is performing
a procedure, the senior attending physician will be sued for inadequate supervision (see Locke v.
Patchtman, 512 N.W.2dn 786 (Mich. 1994)).
One cannot, either theoretically or empirically, assign a value to λ. Rather, we suppose that JSL
reform corresponds to an increase in λ, and therefore JSL reform results in HJSL
law > 0. This is
exactly the opposite e￿ect of a damage cap, and hence from the analysis above we conclude that
JSL reform should reduce complications of labor and delivery.
With regard to procedure choice, if it is the case that there are already excessive C-sections, then
JSL reform should lead to a reduction in the C-section rate. This theory makes a clearly falsi￿able
prediction, namely that the e￿ect of JSL reform should be opposite to the e￿ect of caps. This
prediction is consistent with Kessler and McClellan (1996) in that they ￿nd that direct and indirect
reforms have opposite e￿ects on expenditures, and sometimes on outcomes though this point is not
highlighted in their study.14
While we have emphasized the incentives faced by physicians in the preceding discussion, many
of our arguments also apply to hospitals. In particular, with JSL reform, hospitals have strong
incentives to modify their practices in order to make it less likely that they will be judged responsible
for over 50 percent of the damages (and therefore potentially held liable for paying for 100 percent
of the damages). A recent Institute of Medicine report about the frequency of medical errors and
the relatively few hospitals that have taken systematic steps to reduce them suggests that the scope
for this type of response is large (IOM, 2006).15
Our simple model also leaves out the role of plainti￿’s lawyers ("ambulance chasers"). It is
possible that caps on damages and reforms of joint and several liability both make it less worthwhile
for plainti￿’s lawyers to bring a suit. So the number of suits may fall. As we discussed above, in
15the case of damage caps, this will tend to reinforce the e￿ect of the cap in reducing doctor’s liability
risk.16 In the case of JSL reform, the fact that lawyers now have less incentive to bring suits is
o￿set by the fact that if they do sue, they will now have to go after the most responsible party,
which means that a suit against a physician is a more accurate indicator of competence, and hence
has a greater negative e￿ect on their reputation. This later e￿ect is formally captured in our model
because H includes all costs, including losses associated with a loss in reputation (see MacLeod
(2007) for a review of reputation models, and of how loss of reputation can be viewed as ￿nancial
loss). Therefore, the liability risk faced by doctors may still increase, even if the number of suits
falls. We illustrate this e￿ect in ￿gure 2.
Figure 2 Here
As in ￿gure 2, suppose that the level of procedure choice is illustrated by point X. Now suppose
there is an increase in liability, say due to JSL reform. If this were to a￿ect only cases with no
procedure, then the utility from no procedure falls, as illustrated by the dotted line, resulting in an
increase in procedure use to point Y. Now, if there are also signi￿cant errors when the procedure is
performed, this results in the utility from carrying out the procedure falling to the dashed line in
￿gure 2. If the decrease in utility is su￿cient, then we can arrive at point Z, a decrease in procedure
use relative to the starting point X.
C. Summary. We have extended the standard model of deterrence created by the tort system to
allow for heterogeneity in patient condition. Consistent with the standard economic theory of tort
law, the theory we outline here predicts that with less liability physicians will exert less care (see
Landes and Posner, 1987 ; Shavell, 1987; and Danzon 2000 for exhaustive reviews). We have also
shown that if we view JSL reform from the perspective of agency theory, we can make unambiguous
16predictions regarding the e￿ect of JSL reform. We have also extended the previous literature by
exploring the impact of tort reform on procedure choice. The important point is that the impact of
tort reform depends on whether there is already excessive use of a procedure. Conversely, physician
responses to tort reform provide some evidence about whether there is an excessive use of procedures.
Reforms reducing liability have a tendency to exacerbate an existing problem of excessive proce-
dure use. These results are summarized in the following chart:
Chart 1: The E￿ect of Tort Reform on Physician Care and Cesarean Section Rates
Complications Population Mean Ceasarean Section Rate
Tort Reform Given Health Status Complications If excessive If not excessive
Decreasing the Cap on Liability Increase Increase Increases Decreases
Reforming the JSL Rule Decrease Decrease Decreases Increases
Relative to the prior literature, the theory provides some additional falsi￿able predictions. Namely,
the e￿ect of caps should be the opposite of JSL reform. Also reforms that act like damage caps,
such as modifying the collateral source rule, will have e￿ects similar to caps. Previous empirical
work has sometimes grouped several reforms together. This theoretical analysis suggests that such a
strategy may reduce the estimated e￿ect of the law since some reforms work in opposite directions.
The results also highlight the importance of evidence. A great deal of the existing work on tort
reform is based on the assumption that tort reform must either reduce unnecessary procedure use
or have no e￿ect. We show that it is also possible for tort reform to increase procedure use.
IV. Data
Several previous studies of tort reform rely on data from the American Tort Reform Association
(ATRA), which has tracked reforms enacted after 1986, when it was founded. We employed several
law students to independently look up and record all state statutes that implemented tort reforms,
17and any decisions that subsequently a￿ected the status of these statutes (e.g. if the statute was
subsequently ruled unconstitutional). A major issue here is to determine the pre-1986 status quo.
That is, the ATRA might note that a state passed a tort reform in 1991, but not that it had passed
earlier tort reform legislation in 1984. Moreover, sometimes state legislatures codi￿ed practices that
were already established under common law, so that what appears to be a law change is not. The
ATRA also sometimes misses laws that were over-turned. We have also compared our data with
tort reform data independently collected by Ronen Avraham (2006), using Westlaw to clarify any
discrepancies. One reason for the disparate ￿ndings in the literature may be that there are many
errors in existing data sets regarding tort law. Further information about the construction of this
data set and legal sources is available from the authors in an unpublished Appendix.
Our primary data on outcomes comes from the Vital Statistics natality data. These data come
from birth certi￿cates collected by each state and ￿led with the National Center for Health Statistics.
Since the last revision of the standard birth certi￿cate in 1989, Vital Statistics data has formed a
very rich repository of information about pregnancy risk factors, procedures performed at the time
of birth, and birth outcomes.
We de￿ne high risk using 17 di￿erent variables that indicate whether the mother su￿ers from
conditions such as anemia, cardiac, or lung conditions; diabetes, herpes, eclampsia, or incompetent
cervix; previous large or preterm deliveries; renal failure; rh problems; uterine bleeding or other
medical risk factors. Generally, these risk factors would be known to medical sta￿ before the
delivery and would a￿ect decisions about appropriate procedure use. Our models predict that
doctors should have less discretion over high risk births, so that tort reforms should have smaller
e￿ects in these cases.
The birth certi￿cate lists many possible complications of labor and delivery in a check list format.
Certain types of complications including breech delivery, cephalopelvic disproportion (baby’s head
too big for mother’s pelvis), cord prolapse (umbilical cord delivered prior to baby which may lead to
18cord compression), placenta previa (placenta implanted too close to the cervical opening), abruptio
placenta (premature separation of the placenta from the uterus), and premature rupture of mem-
branes, are unlikely to be caused by the doctor’s behavior at the time of delivery, while others such
as excessive bleeding, fetal distress, meconium, or anesthetic complications may be preventable in
many cases. We are certainly not arguing that any class of complication is always preventable, only
that it is useful to distinguish between those complications that are never preventable, and those
which are at least sometimes preventable. If our model is correct, tort reform should have a larger
e￿ect on potentially preventable complications while having little or no e￿ect on complications that
could never be prevented.
An additional problem is that complications could be mechanically related to C-sections, since
complications might be considered indications for C-section. That is, a doctor may be unlikely to
perform a C-section without indicating on the birth certi￿cate that there was some complication that
warranted such intervention. To address this concern, we examine complications for non-C-section
deliveries separately (though of course, this is a selected sample).
The Vital Statistics data has a great deal of information about factors that might be expected
to in￿uence infant health. We know the infant’s parity (birth order) and gender as well as the
mother’s education, race, age, marital status, and county of residence (which proxies for geographical
di￿erences in procedure use). We control for these variables in all of our models.
The Vital Statistics data is linked to the tort data using the state, month, and year of birth (the
exact date of birth is not given in the public use Vital Statistics data). Table 2 presents means of
key outcome variables, tort variables, and control variables for the years 1989 to 2001. Because the
data set is very large, we use a 10 percent random sample and include only states that experienced
a law change over the sample period.17
The ￿rst two columns of the ￿rst panel of Table 2 compare the means for the full sample to
those for high risk children. As expected, high risk children have higher rates of C-sections and
19complications. They are also somewhat more likely to be born to minority mothers. The remaining
columns of the ￿rst panel of Table 2 indicate that C-section rates and the incidence of complications
are slightly lower for births that took place in jurisdictions with a cap on non-economic damages.
However, the characteristics of mothers also vary across these jurisdictions. For example, births
subject to caps were less likely to be to black or Hispanic women but more likely to be to women
deemed to be high risk in advance of the delivery. Hence, di￿erences in the incidence of outcomes
might re￿ect di￿erences in demographic characteristics. This simple comparison of means highlights
the importance of adequately controlling for other determinants of procedure use when examining
the impact of tort reform.
The second panel of Table 2 shows the relationships between the di￿erent types of reforms that
we consider. It is clear that the reforms tend to move together, but it is equally clear that there are
no one-to-one relationships. For example, roughly 60 percent of births in jurisdictions with a cap
on non-economic damages were also potentially a￿ected by a signi￿cant reform of joint and several
liability laws. (Recall, a JSL reform is coded as signi￿cant if the threshold for a defendant to be
held liable for 100 percent of the damages is at least 50 percent). But only 30 percent of places
with such JSL reforms had also implemented a non-economic damages cap. Whether the extent
to which laws are passed as a group is too great to tease out their separate e￿ects is an empirical
matter that we will return to below.
V. Methods
We explore the relationship between tort reform and outcomes using standard panel data methods.
Since our outcomes are relatively common and we include a large number of county ￿xed e￿ects in
our models, we rely on linear probability models. Our base model is speci￿ed as follows:
20OUTCOMEit = a + b1TORTst + b2XV ARit + b3Y EAR
+b4STATE ∗ TIME + b5COUNTY + eit, (7)
where OUTCOME represents a procedure or health outcome; TORT is a vector of indicators
for the tort reforms; XVAR is a vector of personal characteristics; YEAR is a vector of YEAR
indicators; STATE*TIME is a vector of state speci￿c linear time trends; and COUNTY is a vector
of indicators for all of the counties that are identi￿ed in the Vital Statistics data (generally counties
with over 100,000 population, with balance of each state is treated as an additional ￿county￿ ); and
e is a random error term. The subscript i indicates that the variable is de￿ned at the individual
level, while the subscript s indicates that it is de￿ned at the state level, and t indicates that the
variable is time varying.
XVAR includes controls for the child’s gender and multiple births, indicators for whether the
mother is Hispanic, African American or other race, dummies for each parity from 1 to 4 and for
parity 5 or greater, dummies for the mother’s education (<12, 12, 13-15, or 16+ years), dummies
for mother’s age (19-24, 25-34, 35+), and mother’s marital status. As discussed above, there are
large di￿erences in outcomes between demographic groups. Variables such as race may also interact
with tort reform, if for example, blacks and whites have di￿erent propensities to sue. Hence, it is
important to control for the variables in XVAR.
The year indicators allow there to18 be systematic di￿erences over time, while the state-speci￿c
time trends allow di￿erent states to be on di￿erent trajectories with respect to outcomes. In fact,
these state-speci￿c time trends turn out to be quite signi￿cant in models of C-sections, indicating
that there is wide variation in the growth of C-section rates across states. Finally, the county
indicators help to account for well-known geographic di￿erences in factors such as access to medical
21care and physician practice patterns. Although this is a simple innovation, most previous studies
have not controlled for county ￿xed e￿ects. We estimate our models clustering the standard errors
by state.
While (7) is a simple model, there are many possible permutations of the vector TORT. We
estimate the model including each tort reform separately (as some previous work has done) as well
as estimating a base model that includes all four major tort reforms together. We estimate the
model separately for di￿erent risk groups as discussed above.
Finally, we have conducted a number of additional speci￿cation checks. These include estimating
models that systematically exclude data from each of the largest states in order to see if our results
are driven by a few large states, and estimating models that exclude data from states that passed
reforms that deal only with medical malpractice. The latter models are identi￿ed using only data
from states that passed general tort reforms that also happen to apply to malpractice cases. The
idea is that these law changes are most likely to be exogenous to medical practice.
VI. Results
A. E￿ects on Procedures and Health Outcomes . Our main estimation results are shown in
the ￿rst panel of Table 3. All coe￿cients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. Caps on damages
increase the incidence of C-sections, while JSL reform reduces C-sections. The coe￿cients represent
roughly 5 and 7% increases/decreases in the probability of C-section, respectively. The second
column shows that the estimated e￿ects on the probability that labor was induced or stimulated
are almost identical. This suggests that many of the additional C-sections induced by law changes
were not scheduled C-sections but occurred as a result of problems in deliveries where natural labor
had been hurried along.
In addition to its e￿ects on C-sections, JSL reform reduces the incidence of preventable complica-
tions of labor and delivery. The estimated e￿ects are large, suggesting that caps on non economic
22damages increase preventable complications by 6% while JSL reform reduces them by 13%. The
e￿ects are there even in non-C-section births, but are not there when we look at complications such
as breech birth, which are unlikely to be prevented by physician e￿ort. This pattern of results
provides support for our contention that complications may be prevented by physician e￿ort, which
in turn, is in￿uenced by the incentives created by the tort system.
We ￿nd no e￿ects of tort law changes on the probability of low APGAR scores. This ￿nding
suggests that increases in e￿ort levels and procedure use induced by tort reforms such as damage
caps are not having an e￿ect on infant health.
The second panel of Table 3 shows estimates from models that include each tort reform separately.
That is, every coe￿cient estimate in the table is from a separate regression. The estimated e￿ects
of JSL reform on complications are quite robust, as are the estimated e￿ects of caps on punitive
damages on C-sections. However, the estimates for caps on non-economic damages suggest that
it can be quite misleading to consider these caps separately, perhaps because JSL and NE caps
are often implemented at the same time and tend to have o￿-setting e￿ects. Given the correlations
between some of the tort reforms shown in Table 2, an alternative interpretation is that the estimates
in the ￿rst panel of Table 3 are a￿icted by multicollinearity. However, if this were the case, we
would see a large drop in standard errors between panel 1 and panel 2, which we do not see.
B. Speci￿cation Checks. Table 4 shows estimates of models including leads and lags of law
changes. While one might expect laws that turn "on" to have e￿ects equal and opposite to laws
that turn "o￿", there is an important reason why this may not be the case. In most cases, the law
governing the resolution of a tort is the one that was in e￿ect at the time when the tort occurred.
Thus, even if a doctor foresees that a new law limiting damage caps will be adopted, there is no
reason for her to change her behavior until the law actually passes. However, if the law that was in
e￿ect at the time a tort occurred is subsequently ruled unconstitutional, then doctors will be subject
23to the new law even if the tort occurred under the old (unconstitutional) regime. For example, if a
doctor foresees that a damage cap that is in e￿ect is about to be ruled unconstitutional, the doctor
has an incentive to change her behavior right away, because any cases arising from torts committed
today will be judged under the new law.
The ￿rst three columns of Table 4 show models that include 12 month leads of the law changes.
These models do not include CSR reforms, since these were never statistically signi￿cant. The
estimated e￿ects of contemporaneous law changes are much the same as those shown in Table 3.
Leads of new laws (laws turning on) are never statistically signi￿cant. Leads of laws turning o￿,
however, are sometimes signi￿cant. The estimates suggest that a doctor who anticipates that a cap
on non-economic damages will be ruled unconstitutional reduces C-sections in the 12 months before
the law change. This is consistent with the evidence presented earlier that non-economic damage
caps increase C-section rates. On the other hand, doctors who anticipate that a JSL reform will be
ruled unconstitutional in the next 12 months, appear to reduce e￿ort such that there is an increase
in preventable complications 12 months before the law change. These changes are consistent with
our theory, given the asymmetry in the retro-activity of laws that turn "on" and laws that turn
"o￿".
The next three columns of Table 4 show models that include lags of the law changes. The lags
on laws that turn "on" suggest that these laws become e￿ective quickly, since none of the lags are
statistically signi￿cant. Lags on laws that turn "o￿" suggest some lingering e￿ects. When caps on
punitive damages turn o￿ there is a negative e￿ect on C-sections and on preventable complications.
When caps on non-economic damages are removed, the estimates suggest that the e￿ects on C-
section rates are immediate (i.e. lags are not statistically signi￿cant), but that there is a lingering
positive e￿ect of having had a cap on the incidence of complications.
24Table 5 shows results for high risk and non-high risk groups. Our model implies that doctors
have less discretion in high-risk cases, so that we expect to see smaller e￿ects of tort law changes on
procedure use in this group. While the standard errors are large enough that we cannot conclusively
reject equality of the coe￿cients across columns, Table 5 shows that the point estimates are generally
larger for high risk patients as predicted.
We have also done some additional exploration of caps on non-economic damages, including
interactions of the dummies for the existence of caps with their amounts. The idea was that if a cap
had an e￿ect, then a lower (more binding) cap should be associated with a stronger e￿ect, while
a higher cap should have a weaker e￿ect. We found that the interaction term did tend to have a
sign opposite to the sign of the cap dummy, but it was only (marginally) signi￿cant in the model of
C-sections, suggesting that higher caps produce fewer C-sections. The estimates suggested that a
cap of $1,600,000 or more (which can be compared to the mean cap of $473,803 in our data) would
have a negligible e￿ect on C-sections.
As an additional speci￿cation check, we re-estimated the models in the ￿rst panel of Table 3 after
systematically excluding each large state with a law change. This is a demanding speci￿cation check
since large states account for the majority of births. Our results regarding the e￿ects of JSL and
non-economic damage caps on C-sections were remarkably robust. Results regarding the e￿ects of
JSL reform on preventable complications were also robust. The e￿ect of non-economic damage caps
on preventable complications was less robust, mostly because the standard error increased when we
excluded Pennsylvania, Illinois, or Texas.
Table 6 shows the e￿ect of excluding states that passed laws which pertained only to medical
malpractice, rather than to torts more generally. As discussed above, laws that were passed to deal
with malpractice might have been passed in response to speci￿c incidents of malpractice, and thus
might be regarded as e￿ects rather than causes of changes in physician behavior. Excluding states
25that passed such laws has little qualitative e￿ect on our estimates, though the e￿ect of non-economic
damages caps on preventive complications is now signi￿cant only at the 10% level of con￿dence.
VII. Conclusions
We develop a model that analyzes the incentives created by speci￿c tort reforms and explores
the e￿ect of tort reform on both the level of care and procedure use during child birth. Our model
shows that contrary to popular belief, reducing the threat of malpractice can increase the use of
unnecessary procedures and may reduce the e￿ort made by doctors in realistic scenarios. Second,
we have assembled very detailed data on tort reform in an e￿ort to accurately identify changes in
the laws. We apply this data to a large national panel data set covering an important population,
newborns and their mothers, and examine a range of outcomes representing procedure use, care
taken by physicians, and maternal and infant health. Finally, we show that our results are robust
to many speci￿cation checks.
Our strongest and most robust ￿nding is that JSL reform reduces C-sections, and complications
of labor and delivery. By aligning malpractice risk more closely with the physician’s own actions,
JSL reform causes physicians to take more care and avoid unnecessary and potentially harmful
procedures. In addition, JSL reform may cause hospitals to undertake systematic reforms that are
bene￿cial to patients generally in order to avoid being held responsible for a large share of the dam-
ages in medical malpractice cases. In contrast, caps on damages are found to increase unnecessary
procedure use. They also increase complications of labor and delivery in some speci￿cations.
Hence, in one important example, tort reform that reduces the malpractice risk facing doctors
appears to increase rather than decrease unnecessary procedure use, with harmful e￿ects on patients.
Much of the public and academic discussion of tort reform on medical malpractice is premised on
the idea that reforms must either reduce unnecessary procedure use or have no e￿ect. Our results
demonstrate that the incentives created by the tort system are complex, and interact in important
26ways with other incentives facing physicians. Without knowing more about the speci￿c incentives
faced by physicians it is hazardous to predict that a speci￿c tort reform will either reduce unnecessary
procedure use or have bene￿cial impacts on health.
27VIII. Appendix A
Proposition 1. Tort reform will increase the error rate if and only if the law de-







Proof of Proposition 1. The ￿rst order condition for the optimal error rate is:
(9) 0 = Uα = Bα(s,α∗,p) − H(s,p,law).







The second order conditions for an optimum imply that Uαα < 0, from which the result follows. 
Assumption 1. A tort reform satis￿es the uniformity condition if the marginal e￿ect of the law on
liability is independent of the procedure choice or the condition of the patient. In other words, a law
that changes the liability in the event of an error has the same e￿ect whether the error occurred as
a result of performing a procedure, or as a result of not performing a procedure. That is, for every
s,s0 > 0 then Hlaw(s,P,law) = Hlaw(s0,NP,law) ≡ Hlaw(law).
Proposition 2. Suppose that the uniformity condition holds. Then a legal change that increases
physician liability will increase ¯ s (and therefore decrease procedure use) if and only if the error rate






= sign{Hlaw(law) · (α∗(¯ s(law),P,law) − α∗(¯ s(law),NP,law)},







Proof of Proposition 2. The the physician is indi￿erent between performing or not performing
the procedure when:
(12) U∗(¯ s(law),P,law) = U∗(¯ s(law),NP,law).




{Hlaw(¯ s(law),P,law) · α∗(¯ s(law),P,law) − Hlaw(¯ s(law),NP,law) · α∗(¯ s(law),NP,law)}
Us(P, ¯ s(law),law) − Us(P, ¯ s(law),law)
,
=
{Hlaw(law) · (α∗(¯ s(law),P,law) − α∗(¯ s(law),NP,law))}
Us(¯ s(law),P,law) − Us(¯ s(law),NP,law)
.
The second line follows from the uniformity condition. The fact that physician utility rises faster
with patient condition when a procedure is performed implies that the denominator is positive. This
result combined with the fact that G0 > 0 implies the ￿rst expression of the proposition.












Note that this include two individual e￿ects for patient who do and not not receive the procedure,
plus a third e￿ect arising from changes in treatment for the marginal patient. This third expression
29can be rewritten as:
−Hlaw(law) · (α∗(¯ s(law),NP,law) − α∗(¯ s(law),P,law))2g(¯ s).
This, combined with the fact that Uαα < 0 implies the second expression 11. 
Expression 11 shows that average error rates rise if tort reform reduces liability. This result is
the consequence of two e￿ects. The ￿rst is the direct e￿ect of the reform on a patient conditional
upon health status and procedure choice. The second works via the changes in procedure choice
that occur for patients whose health condition is near the cuto￿ ¯ s. As shown above, this e￿ect has
the same sign as the direct e￿ect, regardless of the relative error rates for the procedure choices.
30IX. Appendix B - Source of Law Data (Not Intended for Publication)
The database of state tort reforms, containing descriptions of and citation information for tort
reforms in place in each U.S. state at di￿erent times between 1985 and 2004, was created using both
law and economics students who were employed as research assistants. The database’s information
about tort reforms was constructed from the text of state legislation using Westlaw and Lexis-
Nexis, on-line databases containing the information used by the legal profession for both litigation
and advising clients, as well as micro-￿ches of early state legislation when the text of the early
legislation was not available on line. We also consulted key cases that determined the common law
rules that were in e￿ect before legislation was enacted. Finding the relevant statues and case law is
di￿cult. To guide the search for this information we used:
(1) American Tort Reform Association’s Tort Reform Record (￿ATRA Record￿ available at
http://www.atra.org/￿les.cgi/8140_Record07-07_3.pdf), which lists reforms enacted since
1986, the year it was founded. The ATRA Record contains the name or number of the
legislative bill that enacted the tort reform, the year the bill was passed, and a description
of the details of each of the tort reforms, although the Record does not give the citation
information of the statutes that the bills enact (the ￿name￿ of the statutes, which is a number
such as California Civil Code ￿ 3333.2 that shows where the statute is to be found in the
state’s statutory code).
(2) Westlaw’s 50 State Surveys of Tort reform and Medical Malpractice (http://www.westlaw.com,
database ￿surveys￿ with search for ￿tort reform￿), lists tort reforms that are currently in-
cluded in a state’s statutory code and provides the citation information for the reforms and
a link to the text of the current version of the reform.
(3) The law ￿rm McCullough, Campbell & Lane LLP publishes on their website a summary of
United States Medical Malpractice Law (Available at http://www.mcandl.com/introduction.html).
31We corrected a number of de￿ciencies in the ATRA Record. For example, it focuses on the enactment
of laws and does not always note whether the enacted reforms are struck down by a state’s Supreme
Court as unconstitutional. The ATRA Record also does not indicate if reforms enacted prior to 1986
are struck down after 1986. The ATRA Record is not always clear on whether the law changes it lists
enact new tort reforms or modify existing tort reform statutes enacted before 1986. Furthermore,
the ATRA Record does not make note of when statutes enacted by state legislatures are codifying
tort reforms that were already part of a state’s common law (the set of laws that were created by
the Supreme Court of that state). For instance, the ATRA Record lists New Mexico as passing a
statute adopting a reform to joint and several liability in 1987, although this reform had already
been adopted by the New Mexico appellate courts in 1982. (See N.M. Stat. Ann. ￿ 41-3A-1 and
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579, N.M.App., March 2,
1982, Certiorari Denied by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, June 17, 1982.)
We corresponded with Ronen Avraham, and cross validated our data with a similar data set
that he has constructed. This resulted in the correction of several errors in both of our data sets.
Avraham (2006) provides a comprehensive data set on enacted tort reform that resulted from this
collaboration. The data set we used for our regressions extend this data by including information
on whether legislation codi￿ed existing common law.
However, coding of the tort reform variables occasionally involves some di￿cult issues of legal
interpretation. For example, in a few states, caps apply only to payments in wrongful death claims,
and not more generally to medical malpractice claims for nonfatal personal injury. We have treated
these states as if caps did not apply. A second issue is that some states have caps on total damages,
rather than caps on non-economic or punitive damages only, that can be awarded in a medical
malpractice claims. We have coded states with total damages caps as having caps on both non-
economic damages and punitive damages (unless punitive damages are speci￿cally excluded).
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38Notes
1See Nightingale F, Notes on hospitals; being two papers read before the National Association
for the Promotion of Social Science, at Liverpool, in October, 1858; with evidence given to the
Royal Commissioners on the state of the Army in 1857. London: Parker; 1859.
2Some legal scholars argue that the tort system also exists to provide insurance. The idea is that
it is easier for providers than patients to purchase insurance, especially since providers can pass
the costs of premiums on by setting higher fees. Priest (1987) points out that higher prices will
disproportionately impact the poor, and that higher premiums may cause insurance markets to fail
as lower risk providers pull out (self insure) causing premiums to go still higher.
3See Dranove (1988) and Pauly (1980) for a discussion of physician induced demand.
4Even more recently, Viscusi and Born (2005) examine data at the insurance company and state-
level from 1984 to 1991 and ￿nd that limits on non-economic damages and punitive damages reduced
insurance payouts and premiums, and increased the pro￿ts of insurance companies
5However, increases in payouts are not necessarily the driving force behind increases in premi-
ums. On average claims are settled 6 years after the premiums used to pay for them were collected.
Insurers typically invest the premiums during that interval, and their pro￿ts are sensitive to the
returns on these investments. A reduction in returns can drive up premiums sharply, as appar-
ently occurred in the early 2000s (Baicker and Chandra, 2005; General Accounting O￿ce, 2003;
Congressional Budget O￿ce, 2004).
6There have been repeated claims that malpractice premiums are driving ob-gyns out of high
premium states, or out of practice (Elias, 2002). However, Mello (2006, page 4) concludes that the
best studies show ￿only small or no e￿ects￿ of the malpractice environment on physician supply (See
39Baicker and Chandra, 2005, Kessler et al. 2005, and Matsa 2005). In one of the few papers to look
at several tort reforms in the same framework, Klick and Stratmann (2005) argue that caps increase
physician supply while the abolition of joint and several liability reduces it. Their OLS estimates
are small (in line with other studies surveyed by Mello) while their instrumental variables estimates
are very large.
7Several previous studies use cross sections of data from single states to examine the e￿ect of
malpractice premiums on obstetrical procedures and infant health outcomes, with mixed results.
These include: Baldwin et al. 1995, Localio et al. 1993, Sloan et al. 1997, and Sloan et al. 1995.
Baicker and Chandra (2005) look at the e￿ect of malpractice premiums on the use of C-sections
and several procedures for Medicare patients using state-level data. They ￿nd no e￿ect. Dubay,
Kaestner, and Waidmann (1999) and Kim (2005) use panels of national vital statistics data and
look at the e￿ects of malpractice premiums on C-sections, ￿nding little e￿ect.
8Some reforms specify that only payments from public sources can be admitted as evidence. In
this paper, we use only reforms that allow payments from private sources to be admitted, but it did
not change our results to use a more liberal de￿nition of reform (i.e. reform =1 if either public or
private payments are admitted).
9We coded JSL=1 if either the rule covering economic damages OR the rule covering non-
economic damages speci￿ed that parties had to be responsible for 50% of the harm before they
could be held liable for 100% of the damages. This coding captures most of the changes in JSL
rules over our sample period. For example, prior to 1989, Texas had enacted a reform that set the
liability threshold at 10%, which they raised to 50% in 1995. New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Ohio
all adopted the 50% threshold. Illinois, Mississippi, and Tennessee all abolished the common law
JSL rule (meaning that people could only be liable for damage they caused). A few changes that
are not captured by our simple algorithm are that Alaska had a 50% threshold that they raised to
40100% in 1989. New Jersey had a 60% threshold for non-economic damages over the whole period,
and raised the threshold for economic damages from 20% to 60% in 1995. In both cases, we take
the view that the states had already enacted signi￿cant JSL reforms before these further changes.
10For example, in Alabama, a cap implemented before the beginning of our sample period was
declared unconstitutional and removed in 1991. Yoon (2001) exploits this feature of the data in his
study of the e￿ects of caps on malpractice awards in Alabama.
11The estimate of four billion is based on the assumption that 15 percent of current C-sections
are unnecessary and that the di￿erence in cost between a C-section and a normal delivery is about
$6,000.
12APGAR stands for activity, pulse, grimace, appearance, and respiration. The infant is given a
maximum score of 2 for each attribute for a maximum score of 10. Most children receive a nine or
higher. We code a score of 8 or lower as low APGAR. Almond, Chay, and Lee (2005) also argue
that APGAR is a better predictor of infant mortality than low birth weight.
13As they point out on page 533, in the absence of transactions costs the Coase theorem implies
that one should get the ￿rst best, regardless of the liability rule.
14For example, in Table 5 which examines e￿ects on ischemic heart disease they ￿nd that indirect
reforms increase 1 year hospital expenditures by 3.4 percent and reduce one year mortality by .4
percent. In contrast, direct reforms reduce spending by 9 percent but have no signi￿cant e￿ect on
mortality.
15The report noted that although 1.5 million people are harmed annually by medication errors in
the U.S., only 6 percent of U.S. hospitals have adopted drug computer-entry systems, which have
been proven to reduce such errors.
4116An additional complication is that a cap could act as a focal point, and hence increase liability
in cases with small damages. Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998) discuss the importance of
such focal points to juries.
17We have veri￿ed that we obtain the same results for Table 3 if we use all of the states.
18Our results for C-sections are not robust to the exclusion of the state-speci￿c time trends,
though our other results are.
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42Table 1: Summary of Changes in State Tort Laws, 1989-2001
Law both
Law "on" Law "off" "on" & "off"
Cap Punitive Damages AK (8/7/1997), IN (6/30/1995),  SD* (1/31/1996) AL* (off 6/25/1993, on 6/7/1999),
NJ (10/27/1995), NC (1/1/1996),  OH* (on 1/27/1997, off 2/25/1998)
ND (4/30/1993), NV (5/30/1989),
PA (1/25/1997), WI* (7/5/1995)
Cap Non-Economic  MT (10/1/1995), ND (8/1/1995) AL* (9/27/1991), NH* (3/13/1991), IL* (on 3/9/1995, off 12/18/1997),
  Damages OR* (7/15/1999), WA* (4/27/1989) OH* (off 8/27/1991, 
on 1/27/1997, off 2/25/1998)
Limit Joint and Several  MS (7/1/1989), NH (1/1/1990), IL* (on 3/9/1995, off 12/18/1997),
  Liability TX (9/1/1995), WI (5/17/1995),  OH* (on 1/27/1997, off 2/25/1998)
TN* (5/4/1992)
Modify the Collateral  ID (3/23/1990), ME (4/24/1990),  GA* (3/15/1991), KS* (4/16/1993),
  Source Rule WI (5/25/1995) KY* (1/19/1995) AL* (off 7/12/1996, on 9/22/2000)
Notes: An asterisk indicates that the law was found unconstitutional, or reversed through a court's decision.  Bold face indicates that the law applied only
to medical malpractice rather than to all torts.  Sources for the laws include Westlaw's 50 State Statutory Surveys on Tort Reform and Medical Malpractice, 
McCullough, Campbell, and Lane LLP's Summary of United States Medical Malpractice Law, Ronen Avraham's Data Base of State Tort Law Reforms (1st Edition),
the American Tort Reform Association Tort Reform Record (1st Edition), and Lexus-Nexus.  For a more complete description, please see the unpublished law data appendix.All State State has State has State has
OUTCOMES Births High Risk has NE Cap JSL Reform CSR refrom PD cap
C-section 0.217 0.297 0.196 0.222 0.217 0.216
Complications 0.335 0.450 0.331 0.325 0.351 0.324
Preventable Compl. 0.265 0.358 0.259 0.255 0.279 0.261
5-minute APGAR < 8 0.031 0.051 0.035 0.030 0.028 0.031
Low Birth Weight 0.077 0.157 0.069 0.077 0.077 0.076
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Male 0.512 0.514 0.512 0.512 0.512 0.512
Multiple Birth 0.027 0.097 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.028
High Risk 0.280 1 0.297 0.280 0.279 0.283
Mother Hispanic 0.133 0.117 0.062 0.154 0.119 0.194
Mother African-American 0.167 0.190 0.106 0.172 0.178 0.161
Mother Other Race 0.033 0.032 0.040 0.038 0.044 0.037
First Birth 0.406 0.387 0.395 0.408 0.404 0.401
Mother HS Dropout 0.218 0.221 0.190 0.225 0.196 0.233
Mother College or More 0.203 0.197 0.207 0.213 0.228 0.208
Teen Mother 0.135 0.134 0.127 0.137 0.121 0.134
Mother Married 0.697 0.665 0.711 0.691 0.698 0.701
Observations 2,392,793 671,176 496,794 1,040,245 673,423 1,483,207
All State State has State has State has
TORT REFORM MEASURES Births has NE Cap JSL Reform CSR refrom PD cap
State has NE Cap 0.208 1 0.264 0.260 0.205
Amount if Cap 439264 439264 370977 354072 371471
State has JSL Reform 0.435 0.552 1 0.557 0.473
State has CSR Reform 0.281 0.352 0.361 1 0.320
State has PD Cap ($) 0.590 0.613 0.674 0.705 0.953
Amount if Cap ($) 293086 257264 388291 353572 293086
State has PD Cap (multip 0.523 0.477 0.479 0.602 0.844
Amount if Cap (multiple) 3.073 2.938 2.728 4.230 3.073
Notes: The sample is drawn from the National Vital Statistics Natality Files for 1989-2001 and consists
of a 10% random sample of births from states that experienced a law change. (These states are listed in
Table 1).  NE Cap indicates a cap on non-economic damages, while PD cap indicates a cap on 
punitive damages.  Caps on punitive damages may be specified in either dollar terms or as a multiple of 
the economic damages.   Births are considered to be high risk if they have one of the risk factors 
listed in the text.  Non-preventable complications include: breech delivery, cephalopelvic disproportion,  
cord prolapse, placenta previa, abruptio placenta, and premature rupture of membranes.  All other 
complications are considered preventable and include: maternal fever, meconium (moderate/heavy),
excessive bleeding not from abruptio placenta or placenta previa, maternal seizures, precipitous labor,
prolonged labor, dysfunctional labor, anesthetic complications, fand etal distress.
Table 2: Means of Key Variables by Law in Effect at Time of Birth or Risk Group Table 3: Effects of Tort Reforms
a) Overall Effects, Four Laws Entered
Induction/ Preventable Other No-C sect.
C- Stimulation Compli- Compli- Compli- Low 
Procedures: sections Labor cations cations cations Apgar
Any PD Cap 0.86* 0.61 1.17 0.19 0.85 0.05
[0.32] [.65] [2.21] [0.20] [2.20] [0.05]
Any NE Cap 1.20** 1.2 1.59* -0.35 0.62 0.07
[0.37] [.62] [0.73] [0.30] [0.57] [0.09]
JSL Reform -1.74** -1.76** -3.49** 0.35 -2.20* -0.09
[0.50] [.72] [1.03] [0.27] [0.90] [0.12]
CSR Reform 0.43 1.02 1.06 0.06 0.77 0.04
[0.54] [.56] [0.82] [0.21] [0.81] [0.12]
Observations 2,392,793 2,392,793 2,392,793 2,392,793 1,852,997 1,942,247
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01
b) Effects with Tort Laws Entered Separately (Each Cell From a Separate Regression Model)
Induction/ Preventable Other No-C sect.
C- Stimulation Compli- Compli- Compli- Low 
Procedures: sections Labor cations cations cations Apgar
Any PD Cap 0.83 0.48 1.00 0.19 0.67 0.01
[0.41] [.64] [2.14] [0.20] [2.08] [0.08]
Any NE Cap 0.40 0.36 -0.09 -0.14 -0.44 -0.02
[0.26] [.59] [0.66] [0.22] [0.60] [0.04]
JSL Reform -0.94 -1.06 -2.38* 0.19 -1.67* -0.08
[0.64] [.58] [1.05] [0.27] [0.78] [0.07]
CSR Reform 0.27 -0.54 0.64 0.17 0.52 -0.12
[0.45] [.59] [0.71] [0.21] [0.67] [0.14]
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors multiplied by 100.  Linear probability models
include dummy variables for county, state-specific time trends, month, and year 
dummies, in addition to controls for child gender, multiple births, indicators for 
mother Hispanic, African American or other race, dummies for each parity from 1 to 4
and for parity 5+, dummies for mother's education (<12, 12, 13-15, 16+ years), 
mother's age (19-24, 25-34, 35+) and marital status.  Complications that are not considered
Other complications are considered to be preventable.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.  A ** or * indicates 
statistical significance at 99 or 95%, respectively.
preventable are breech position, cephalopelvic disproportion, cord prolapse, premature 
rupture of membrane, abruptio placenta, and placenta previa.Table 4: Leads and Lagged Effects of Tort Reforms
Leads Lags
Leads Preventable Lags Preventable
C- Compli- Low C- Compli- Low
Procedures: sections cations APGAR sections cations APGAR
Any PD Cap 0.96* 1.84 0.06 0.89* 1.56 0.01
[0.39] [2.45] [0.07] [0.38] [2.73] [0.06]
  12 month lead/lag law ON 0.25 -0.32 0.18 -0.35 -2.25 0.20**
[0.57] [0.82] [0.15] [0.43] [2.69] [0.06]
  12 month lead/lag law OFF -0.35 -3.47 0.01 -0.27* -1.81* -0.01
[0.64] [1.80] [0.10] [0.10] [0.85] [0.04]
Any NE Cap 1.23** 1.29 0.09 1.26** 1.92** 0.05
[0.39] [0.68] [0.10] [0.40] [0.65] [0.08]
  12 month lead/lag law ON -0.4 -0.83 3.51 0.19 -0.58 0.72**
[3.56] [5.98] [3.33] [0.23] [0.32] [0.09]
  12 month lead/lag law OFF -0.73* -0.76 -0.08 0.48 1.16** -0.02
[0.32] [0.64] [0.09] [0.25] [0.37] [0.09]
JSL Reform -1.73** -3.41** -0.1 -1.77** -3.30** -0.11
[0.47] [0.97] [0.15] [0.48] [1.07] [0.15]
  12 month lead/lag law ON 0.24 -1.2 -3.5 -0.01 0.58 -0.66**
[3.52] [5.96] [3.33] [0.27] [0.97] [0.12]
  12 month lead/lag law OFF 0.88 2.45** 0.12 -0.48 0.13 -0.04
[0.45] [0.80] [0.15] [0.24] [0.58] [0.07]
Observations 2,392,793 2,392,793 1,942,247 2,392,793 2,392,793 1,942,247
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01
See notes to Table 3. 
A 12 month lead is a dummy that is equal to one in the 12 months before a law changes.
A 12 month lag is a dummy that is equal to one in the 12 months after a law changes.Table 5: Effects of Tort Reform on Subgroups
Non High High 
Non High High Risk Risk
Risk Risk Preventable Preventable
C-section C-section ComplicationsComplications
Any PD Cap 0.90** 0.46 0.96 1.37
[0.28] [0.45] [2.14] [2.00]
Any NE Cap 1.13** 1.14* 1.90* 0.69
[0.34] [0.41] [0.78] [0.59]
JSL Reform -1.67** -1.26** -3.37** -3.15**
[0.51] [0.39] [1.08] [0.92]
CSR Reform 0.65 -0.27 0.86 1.38
[0.60] [0.42] [0.83] [0.97]
Observations 1,721,617 671,176 1,721,617 671,176
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04





Any PD Cap 0.97 6.22
[0.85] [5.28]
Any NE Cap 1.41* 1.79
[0.50] [0.91]
JSL Reform -1.92** -2.76*
[0.44] [1.08]




Notes: Deleted States include AL, 
ME, MT, OH, ND, PA, RI, SD and WI.